§ 7502(b)(6). No. 163 0 obj <> endobj In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.

82-1005, 82-1247 and 82-1591. h�bbd``b`� $j��\ �j� G)�e��^p�L��'�GN;.0Ht00ht4 �d�t Y� >GT���ЌP�`��%@$�,������U� ����A�a���i���&0�224 In the 1970 Amendments that definition was not only applicable to the NSPS program required by § 111, but also was made applicable to a requirement of § 110 that each state implementation plan contain a procedure for reviewing the location of any proposed new source and preventing its construction if it would preclude the attainment or maintenance of national air quality standards.16, In due course, the EPA promulgated NAAQS's, approved SIP's, and adopted detailed regulations governing NSPS's for various categories of equipment. Ibid. See Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408, 61 S.Ct. The 94th Congress, confronting these competing interests, was unable to agree on what response was in the public interest: legislative proposals to deal with nonattainment failed to command the necessary consensus.19, In light of this situation, the EPA published an Emissions Offset Interpretative Ruling in December 1976, see 41 Fed.Reg. 1470, 1479, 43 L.Ed.2d 731 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. Held: The EPA's plantwide definition is a permissible construction of the statutory term "stationary source." First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties' briefs create the impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agency and in the 32 jurisdictions opting for the "bubble concept," but one which was never waged in the Congress. 1035, 1042, 13 L.Ed.2d 904 (1965); Social Security Board v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369, 66 S.Ct. Use of only a plant-wide definition of source will permit plant-wide offsets for avoiding NSR of new or modified pieces of equipment. 1055, 1072, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974). 44 Fed.Reg. Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.8 Pursuant to that rubric, at step one, courts examine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”9 If so, “that is the end of the matter” and courts must enforce the “unambiguously The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub.L. The EPA's summary of its proposed Ruling discloses a flexible rather than rigid definition of the term "source" to implement various policies and programs: "In summary, EPA is proposing two different ways to define source for different kinds of NSR programs: "(1) For PSD and complete Part D SIPs, review would apply only to plants, with an unrestricted plant-wide bubble. In this Court respondents expressly reject the basic rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision. "Promulgation of the dual definition follows the mandate of Alabama Power, which held that, while EPA could not define 'source' as a combination of sources, EPA had broad discretion to define 'building,' 'structure,' 'facility,' and 'installation' so as to best accomplish the purposes of the Act." The ordinary meaning of the term "facility" is some collection of integrated elements which has been designed and constructed to achieve some purpose. 377]. 50766. 84 Stat. In many areas of the country, particularly the most industrialized States, the statutory goals were not attained.18 In 1976, the 94th Congress was confronted with this fundamental problem, as well as many others respecting pollution control.

�й�'&�p��qՐk�XHU�Q�4�C���"�Ш���GJ�6u�-G�P2�(uj}j-q����0O�%3ZZ S8�e׎ˬ����(A�ȸ�s1�)F��ۛVy׮M�!�R`N۬��)���mB^jGx@�S�v{%��K�ڑ0��Dq��a��v[�n+a�r���W�F�����x���}p��7�]H��S�БD\FG��t:T�椨WU)q¼=ޱ>U��,/�&o��@� ��r� 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153, 67 S.Ct. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 204 U.S.App.D.C. "7. Section 302(j), however, defines the term "major stationary source" as follows: "(j) Except as otherwise expressly provided, the terms 'major stationary source' and 'major emitting facility' mean any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant (including any major emitting facility or source of fugitive emissions of any such pollutant, as determined by rule by the Administrator)." 745-751 (Part D of Title I of the amended Act, 42 U.S.C. %%EOF 3 The court observed that the relevant part of the amended Clean Air Act "does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary source, to which the permit program . Respondents3 filed a timely petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 851, 88 L.Ed. Respondents argue if an old plant containing several large emitting units is to be modernized by the replacement of one or more units emitting over 100 tons of pollutant with a new unit emitting less—but still more than 100 tons—the result should be no different simply because "it happens to be built not at a new site, but within a pre-existing plant." 95-95, 91 Stat. endstream endobj 170 0 obj <>stream Brief for Respondents 4. 1683. endstream endobj 1216 0 obj <>/Metadata 76 0 R/Pages 1213 0 R/StructTreeRoot 150 0 R/Type/Catalog>> endobj 1217 0 obj <>/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]/Parent 1213 0 R/Resources<>/ProcSet[/PDF/Text/ImageB/ImageC/ImageI]/XObject<>>>/Rotate 0/StructParents 0/Tabs/S/Type/Page>> endobj 1218 0 obj <>stream . . "(1) The term 'reasonable further progress' means annual incremental reductions in emissions of the applicable air pollutant (including substantial reductions in the early years following approval or promulgation of plan provisions under this part and section 110(a)(2)(I) and regular reductions thereafter) which are sufficient in the judgment of the Administrator, to provide for attainment of the applicable national ambient air quality standard by the date required in section 172(a)." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); and (2) the court should not have found that the plaintiff unreasonably exercised its rulemaking authority in issuing portions of Regulation O under step two of the Chevron analysis. 170, 172-173, 81 L.Ed. . It stated: "Section 117 of the bill, adopted during full committee markup establishes a new section 127 of the Clean Air Act. This gives meaning to all of the terms—a single building, not part of a larger operation, would be covered if it emits more than 100 tons of pollution, as would any facility, structure, or installation. The Administrator is authorized, moreover, to modify or amend that ruling in accordance with the intent and purposes of this section. 27076 (1977).

Decided in 1984, Chevron USA Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council Inc, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is one of the U.S. Supreme Court’s most frequently cited administrative law decisions. Respondents filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals, which set aside the regulations embodying the "bubble concept" as contrary to law. Such policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges.38. Moreover, the fact that the agency has adopted different definitions in different contexts adds force to the argument that the definition itself is flexible, particularly since Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute. There is no other single issue which more clearly poses the conflict between pollution control and new jobs. See id., at 20372, 20379, 51924, 51951, 51958. We hold that the EPA's definition of the term "source" is a permissible construction of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth. This definition precludes a large plant from being separated into individual production lines for purposes of determining applicability of the offset requirements." EPA compounded the mistake in the 1981 rules here under review, in which it abandoned the dual definition."

See, e.g., United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834, 104 S.Ct. h�bbd```b``�"�A$S�d�"c��e`� �8 H22.��yAl�/`�K@�8H�M ����w�#��|�!C�g��� � �nh

H���]o�0��#�?�Kg���HU%��4F��z�:`H+�,�ؿ���R�PbLJ�o�s��S qw[������n]��Ϳ�]������>6����l�Z���fO~}�ݥ�fSϷ����g��I)�u�`;��w��� �x@�.�EPD��f�0�P��y�17 ˟�~�lf�nvw�{0� �w��+�։ht�V�]|"�&�J0�@9N��zeX�#N8&��#��Y�Z����=��B>� �+�aV�H��X�k���$X�E G�Cn� 4-��0y"�&QG �u����3d�U�e"���4�U漊9fYp�%m��,oI�����R��zEٞOGi��t6�� Respondents recognize that, and hence point to § 111(a)(3). . 1702, 1711-1712, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-746, 93 S.Ct. [an] effective reconciliation of these twofold ends. 46 Fed.Reg. 1554, 1560, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961). 859-866. See generally Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63-64, 95 S.Ct.

We note that the EPA in fact adopted the language of that definition in its regulations under the permit program. Id., at 276, n. 39, 685 F.2d, at 726, n. 39.5 Based on two of its precedents concerning the applicability of the bubble concept to certain Clean Air Act programs,6 the court stated that the bubble concept was "mandatory" in programs designed merely to maintain existing air quality, but held that it was "inappropriate" in programs enacted to improve air quality. 3276 (1979), the EPA, in effect, provided a bifurcated answer to that question. In addition, respondents argue that the legislative history and policies of the Act foreclose the plantwide definition, and that the EPA's interpretation is not entitled to deference because it represents a sharp break with prior interpretations of the Act. See generally, R. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 174-175 (1921). EPA proposes use of the definition of 'source' (see above) to limit the use of the bubble under nonattainment requirements in the following respects: "i. 747. H��VmO�0�)����~9۱�"�u���J�0��Aa� � The fact that the EPA has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term "source" does not lead to the conclusion that no deference should be accorded the EPA's interpretation of the statute.