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SAGE Publications Ltd, and Stichting Research and Politics, unless otherwise noted. This includes 30 failed coups, seven democratizing coups, seven adverse regime change coups and five leader-reshuffling coups.

In this class of theoretical models, the only risk to an autocratic regime arises from would-be democrats not from rebels or revolutionaries who would topple a dictatorship and replace it with another. The estimate from the verification model suggests that increasing unearned income lowers the risk of failure from roughly 10% to less than 1%.

Finally, they wish to thank Victor Menaldo for sharing data and replication code. The Joseph Wright Centre is situated in Derby city’s Cathedral Quarter – a hub of inspiration for around 1,600 students. Some society journals require you to create a personal profile, then activate your society account, You are adding the following journals to your email alerts, Did you struggle to get access to this article? Legacy. Further, we show that many coups in dictatorships lead to increases in human rights abuses. Political Science [remove] 12; Degree. In 1932 his widow, Elizabeth, published a biography of Wright, The Life of Joseph Wright. FundingThe author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Barbara Geddes and Joseph Wright acknowledge funding for this research from the National Science Foundation (BCS-0904478 and BCS-090463). Figure 6. At the extreme, coups precipitated deadly civil conflicts in Algeria (1991–1999) and Rwanda (1994), while a 1999 coup in Côte d’Ivoire unleashed a decade of political violence and repression, culminating in foreign intervention.

British Journal of Political Science  47(1):1-17 (with Matthew Wilson) We discuss how several additional measures of autocratic regime instability substantively differ from data that measure who has defacto power. Department of Political Science COVID Updates, I teach in the Department of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University and currently serve as the co-Director of the Global and International Studies (GLIS) program. A second study, Ahmed (2012), tests whether “unearned” income from foreign aid and remittances influences government stability using data on leader failure from the DPI. The perils of unearned foreign income: aid, remittances, and government survival, New tools in comparative political economy: the database of political institutions, Foreign aid and regime change: a role for donor intent, Aid is not oil: donor preferences, heterogeneous aid, and the aid-democratization relationship, Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance, Peace through insecurity tenure and international conflict, Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war, Conditioning the effects of aid: cold war politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa. Princeton University. I have read and accept the terms and conditions, View permissions information for this article.

Cambridge University Press (with Barbara Geddes and Erica Frantz) (2015) for a discussion of reshuffling versus regime-change coups. In doing so, we focus on the GWF measure of autocratic regime breakdown, and leave analysis that employs the Svolik data for the Online Appendix. If this is positive, it indicates there is more repression in the post-coup than the pre-coup year. It first provides some background: a definition of coups, and a description of how patterns associated with them have changed over time.

The three bars in the middle show that the remaining cases of DPI government turnover correspond to one of the three types of GWF regime failure: democracy to autocracy, autocracy to democracy, or one type of autocracy to another.

... BA Political Science. Unearned income and government failure, by regime remaining in power. Biography: I teach in the Department of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University and currently serve as the co-Director of the Global and International Studies program.I previously held the Jeffrey L. and Sharon D. Hyde Early Career Professorship.I completed my Ph.D. at UCLA in 2007. We explore the coup–repression nexus in this section. Though we cannot be statistically confident that repression increases after coups – even for reshuffling coups – we nevertheless believe there are some patterns worth noting. Polity) often capture – for example, the 1990 legalization of opposition parties in the former Zaire.