392 U. S. 25-26. Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly rich in diversity. "Search" and "seizure" are not talismans. The manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all. Moreover, the meaning of "probable cause" is deeply imbedded in our constitutional history. 'For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth amendment.'.

Terry and Chilton were arrested, indicted, tried, and convicted together. I join the opinion of the Court, reserving judgment, however, on some of the Court's general remarks about the scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule which the Court has fashioned in the process of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. And, in justifying the particular intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. I mention this line of analysis because I think it vital to point out that it cannot be applied in this case. P. 392 U. S. 12. 6.

It does not follow that, because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips. Write. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought.

"I get more purpose to watch them when I seen their movements," he testified. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him, but to be in his presence.

the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App.2d 122, 125—130, 214 N.E.2d 114, 117—120 (1966).

223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).20 Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. In other words, police officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable cause. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 354-356 (1967). 679, 13 L.Ed.2d 568 (1965), rested squarely on the notion that a 'frisk' was not a 'search,' see nn.

If weapons are found, an arrest will follow. We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons. Although its first decision in this area, People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man, in the circumstances, would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Officer McFadden had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece -- in all, roughly a dozen trips. Thus, Officer McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and saw them stop in front of Zucker's store to talk to the same man who had conferred with them earlier on the street corner.

This holding, with which I agree and with which I think the Court agrees, offers the only satisfactory basis I can think of for affirming this conviction.

The central themes of this case are “Terry stop-and-frisk”, searches and seizures, the right to privacy included in the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as the basis for the exclusionary rule). A police officer's right to make an on-the-street 'stop' and an accompanying 'frisk' for weapons is of course bounded by the protections afforded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This scheme is justified in part upon the notion that a 'stop' and a 'frisk' amount to a mere 'minor inconvenience and petty indignity,'4 which can properly be imposed upon the citizen in the interest of effective law enforcement on the basis of a police officer's suspicion.5, On the other side the argument is made that the authority of the police must be strictly circumscribed by the law of arrest and search as it has developed to date in the traditional jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment.6 It is contended with some force that there is not—and cannot be—a variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an arrest. 392 U. S. 30-31. regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Officer McFadden had no probable cause to arrest Terry for anything, but he had observed circumstances that would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent policeman to suspect that Terry was about to engage in burglary or robbery. Write. Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth, [Footnote 4] is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched.

In my view, it is temporary detention, warranted by the circumstances, which chiefly justifies the protective frisk for weapons. The Background of Terry v. Ohio (1968) Martin McFadden, who was a police officer in the State of Ohio’s Cleveland Division, had noticed that two individuals appeared to be acting in a nature perceived as suspicious by McFadden. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. The Court defined a “seizure” as an incident in which the police approach an individual and “restrain his freedom to walk away”. Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely allied with the Fifth,4 is rewritten, the person and the effects of the individual are beyond the reach of all government agencies until there are reasonable grounds to believe (probable cause) that a criminal venture has been launched or is about to be launched. available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Spell. 5. 'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.' Our first task is to establish at what point in this encounter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant. He never did invade Katz' person beyond the outer surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon. Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent of the governmental interests involved. Statement of Facts: Officer McFadden observed two men outside of a store walking up to the window then away several times. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." A third man met up with the initial two and engaged in conversation. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. Gravity.

223, 229, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 34—37, 83 S.Ct. This sort of police conduct may, for example, be designed simply to help an intoxicated person find his way home, with no intention of arresting him unless he becomes obstreperous. Purely for his own protection, the court held, the officer had the right to pat down the outer clothing of these men, who he had reasonable cause to believe might be armed. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964), is also justified on other grounds, ibid., and can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. At the time of their 'seizure' without a warrant they must possess facts concerning the person arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that 'probable cause' was indeed present.

507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. I join the opinion of the Court, reserving judgment, however, on some of the Court's general remarks about the scope and purpose of the exclusionary rule which the Court has fashioned in the process of enforcing the Fourth Amendment. A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a … At this point, keeping Terry between himself and the others, the officer ordered all three men to enter Zucker's store. 222, 92 L.Ed.