. “With just the click of a button, the Government can access each [company’s] deep repository of historical [financial] information at practically no expense.” Ante, at 12–13. Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses.

The time to file the joint appendix and petitioner's brief on the merits is extended to and including August 7, 2017. In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case the Government fails to appreciate the lack of comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI. See Donovan, 464 U. S., at 415. Id., at 456–457.

See Davies 710. According to Carpenter, this absence of knowledge suggests that the SCA gives no meaningful guidance on whether the warrantless collection of cell site location data is reasonable. If, for example, “the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,” individuals could not realistically expect privacy in their homes. Fourth Amendment arguments based on positive law by failing to preserve them. Why is the relevant fact the seven days of information the government asked for instead of the two days of information the government actually saw? Because Miller gave up “dominion and control” of the relevant information to his bank, Rakas, 439 U. S., at 149, the Court ruled that he lost any protected

428 U. S. 543, 560–561 (1976). 119, 122 (2002); Clancy, The 2703(d), for release of records for 16 numbers, including “[a]ll subscriber information, toll records and call detail records including listed and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from" the phones for relevant dates and “cell site information for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination” to obtain evidence against Sanders, Carpenter and others. Nor do his contracts with Sprint and MetroPCS make the records his, even though such provisions could exist in the marketplace. No. It is true that the Cyber Age has vast potential both to expand and restrict individual freedoms in dimensions not contemplated in earlier times. We granted certiorari. Justice Kennedy believes that there is such a rubric—the “property-based concepts” that, Justice Kennedy argues that this case is in a different category from. They rest upon the commonsense principle that the absence of property law analogues can be dispositive of privacy expectations. Carpenter v. United States, No. . While this Court is supposed to base its decisions on society’s expectations of privacy, society’s expectations of privacy are, in turn, shaped by this Court’s decisions. Nor is this the end of it. [1] The Court held, in a 5–4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, that the government violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by accessing historical CSLI records containing the physical locations of cellphones without a search warrant. Fourth Amendment and property law, 389 U. S., at 353, and this Court has repeatedly downplayed the importance of property law under the Katz test, see, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, General warrants and writs of assistance were noxious not because they allowed the Government to acquire evidence in criminal investigations, but because of the means by which they permitted the Government to acquire that evidence. 96 U. S. 727 (1878), this Court held that sealed letters placed in the mail are “as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.” Id., at 733. Crim. Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz attempted to articulate the standard that was missing from the majority opinion. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. Fourth Amendment ought to “be liberally construed,” id., at 635, and further reasoned that compulsory process “effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure” by “forcing from a party evidence against himself,” id., at 622. What persons purchase and to whom they talk might disclose how much money they make; the political and religious organizations to which they donate; whether they have visited a psychiatrist, plastic surgeon, abortion clinic, or AIDS treatment center; whether they go to gay bars or straight ones; and who are their closest friends and family members. Fourth Amendment merely requires him to identify a source of “positive law” that “protects against access by the public without consent.” Brief for Petitioner 32–33 (citing Baude & Stern, The Positive Law Model of the 8 C. J. S., Bailments §36, pp. Post, at 12. The government charged Carpenter with six, and Sanders with two, Hobbs Act counts, 18 U.S.C. In this case petitioner challenges the Government’s right to use compulsory process to obtain a now-common kind of business record: cell-site records held by cell phone service providers.

From that point forward, federal courts in the United States could compel the production of documents regardless of whether those documents were held by parties to the case or by third parties. Another point seems equally true: just because you have to entrust a third party with your data doesn’t necessarily mean you should lose all 1856)). Stuntz, supra, at 404–409; M. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case (1978). This is true even when the records contain personal and sensitive information. Ibid. Given the prominence Katz has claimed in our doctrine, American courts are pretty rusty at applying the traditional approach to the By implying otherwise, the Court tries the nice trick of seeking shelter under the cover of precedents that it simultaneously perforates. (d) This decision is narrow. 460 U. S. 276 (1983), we considered the Government’s use of a “beeper” to aid in tracking a vehicle through traffic. Fourth Amendment”).

Fourth Amendment came about in response to a trio of 18th century cases “well known to the men who wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights, [and] famous throughout the colonial population.” Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L. J. [9] Although §222 “protects the interests of individuals against wrongful uses or disclosures of personal data, the rationale for these legal protections has not historically been grounded on a perception that people have property rights in personal data as such.” Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property? Fourth Amendment that it purports to define, see ante, at 5; Smith, supra. L. J. Consequently, an order issued under §2703(d) is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records.

There is no law requiring them to do so.

Cell phone location information is not truly “shared” as one normally understands the term. That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant. 488 U. S. 445 (1989), which says that a police helicopter hovering 400 feet above a person’s property invades no reasonable expectation of privacy.
"[24][original research? filed. § 1951.” The magistrates issued the warrants pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, which requires the government to demonstrate “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.”. These records could not reveal where Carpenter lives and works, much less his “ ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’ ” Ante, at 12 (quoting Jones, supra, at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. As a result, if law enforcement is confronted with an urgent situation, such fact-specific threats will likely justify the warrantless collection of CSLI. . If they are required to do so, the effects are as predictable as they are alarming: Many investigations will sputter out at the start, and a host of criminals will be able to evade law enforcement’s reach. Fourth Amendment. See ante, at 5, and n. 1. Carpenter relies on an order from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which weakly states that “ ‘. The Court also determined that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the public from the government obtaining information necessary to get communications from point A to point B. 467 U. S. 735, 742–743 (1984).

Rev., at 1852. Whatever its ultimate effect, the change reveals that the Founders understood the phrase “persons, houses, papers, and effects” to be an important measure of the “One well-recognized exception applies when ‘ “the exigencies of the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the In United States v. Jones, FBI agents installed a GPS tracking device on Jones’s vehicle and remotely monitored the vehicle’s movements for 28 days. The Government acquired the records through an investigative process enacted by Congress. Fourth Amendment because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause. For a phone call, for example, the provider records the date, time, and duration of the call; the phone numbers making and receiving the call; and, most relevant here, the cell site used to make the call, as well as the specific antenna that made the connection.

332 U. S. 581, 595 (1948).

In my respectful view the majority opinion misreads this Court’s precedents, old and recent, and transforms Miller and Smith into an unprincipled and unworkable doctrine. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. See The Federalist No. Fourth Amendment interests once records are given to a third party, property law may preserve them.


Fourth Amendment rights people have in cell-site location information, explaining that “no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection.” Ante, at 5. Fourth Amendment does not confer rights with respect to the persons, houses, papers, and effects of others.