One is of course tempted to make an exception in a case like this, where the Government is imposing a noncompensatory remedy to enforce direct exercise of its regulatory authority, because there comes immediately to mind the role of the sentencing judge in a criminal proceeding. . United States v. Tull: A Polluter's Right To A Jury Trial. 107a-108a. Given this statutory silence, we must answer the constitutional question presented. 39190-39191 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U. S., at 538, n. 10. The Court has also considered the practical limitations of a jury trial and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law in holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings. App. . One is of course tempted to make an exception in a case like this, where the government is imposing a non-compensatory remedy to enforce direct exercise of its regulatory authority, because there comes immediately to mind the role of the sentencing judge in a criminal proceeding. The Clean Water Act (Act) authorizes injunctive relief against violators (33 U.S.C.

The Court of Appeals affirmed over a dissent, rejecting petitioner's argument that, under the Seventh Amendment, he was entitled to a jury trial. Instead each kind of relief is separably authorized in a separate and distinct statutory provision. . The Seventh Amendment is silent on the question whether a jury must determine the remedy in a trial in which it must determine liability.9 The answer must depend on whether the jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the "substance of the common-law right of trial by jury." Prior to the enactment of the Seventh Amendment, English courts had held that a civil penalty suit was a particular species of an action in debt that was within the jurisdiction of the courts of law. This case has been cited by other opinions: The following opinions cover similar topics: CourtListener is a project of Free

Id., at 627. Ibid. 4. The Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a jury trial to assess civil penalties under the Act. Subsection (b) authorizes relief in the form of temporary or permanent injunctions. [4] The Court has also considered the practical limitations of a jury trial and its functional compatibility with proceedings outside of traditional courts of law in holding that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative proceedings.

The Court stated that the instruction requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt was incorrect because: "While the defendant was entitled to have the issues tried before a jury, this right did not arise from Article III of the Constitution or from the Sixth Amendment, for both relate to prosecutions which are strictly criminal in their nature, but it derives out of the fact that in a civil action of debt involving more than twenty dollars a jury trial is demandable."

I can recall no precedent for judgment of civil liability by jury but assessment of amount by the court. 23 (No. Brief for the United States 24, n. 17. Even punitive damages are assessed by the jury when liability is determined in that fashion. App.

" W. Prosser, Law of Torts 583 (4th ed. Ibid.

" Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973). The court also granted separate injunctive relief: it ordered the restoration of wetlands on the portions of Mire Pond and Eel Creek still owned by petitioner, 615 F. 123 Cong.Rec. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442-443 (1975) (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S., at 196.6. See Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. This action is clearly analogous to the 18th-century action in debt, and federal courts have rightly assumed that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial. 33 U.S.C.

Congress could, I suppose, create a private cause of action by one individual against another for a fixed amount of damages, but it surely does not follow that if it creates such a cause of action without prescribing the amount of damages, that issue could be taken from the jury. Brief for United States 38. JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 232 U.S., at 47, 34 S.Ct., at 216 (citation omitted). Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 152 (1973). The Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial to determine liability in actions by the Government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Act. The court concluded that, while in Hepner and Regan the civil penalties were statutorily prescribed fixed amounts, the District Court in the present case exercised "statutorily conferred equitable power in determining the amount of the fine." We must decide therefore whether Congress can, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, authorize judges to assess civil penalties. An action for disgorgement of improper profits is, however, a poor analogy. We reject this novel approach. " Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192, n. 6, 94 S.Ct. Id. App. Ibid. 1776) (characterizing civil penalty suit as a type of action in debt); Calcraft v. Gibbs, 5 T. R. 19, 101 Eng. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193, 94 S.Ct. Rec. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. 267 (No. We reverse.

The punitive nature of the relief sought in this present case is made apparent by a comparison with the relief sought in an action to abate a public nuisance.

§ 1251 et seq. 425-427. The Government argues, however, that — rather than an action in debt — the closer historical analogue is an action to abate a public nuisance.

1971) (footnote omitted).

One is the suit of the sovereign in the English courts of equity for a "purpresture" to enjoin or order the repair of an enclosure or obstruction of public waterways; the other is the suit of the sovereign to enjoin "offensive trades and manufactures" that polluted the environment.

We do not think so. "

Robert H. Whaley and Bryan P. Harnetiaux filed a brief for the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

1078, and that it (the Wong Wing Case) was not referred to. One is of course tempted to make an exception in a case like this, where the Government is imposing a noncompensatory remedy to enforce direct exercise of its regulatory authority, because there comes immediately to mind the role of the sentencing judge in a criminal proceeding. "'Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.'" . Both of these 18th-century actions, then, could be asserted by the sovereign to seek relief for an injury to the public in numerous contexts.

The Government concedes that triable issues of fact were presented by disputes between experts involving the composition and nature of the fillings. 123 Cong. 2. 1971) (hereinafter Prosser) (footnote omitted). 615 F. Supp. Petitioner does not base his Seventh Amendment claim on the Government's prosecution under this statute, which provides for injunctive relief but not for civil penalties. Petitioner contended, however, that the property in question did not constitute "wetlands." A public nuisance action was a classic example of the kind of suit that relied on the injunctive relief provided by courts in equity.

39190-39191 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). When Congress enacted the 1977 amendments to the Clean Water Act, it endorsed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) then-existing penalty calculation policy. App. Finally, the Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition to, or independent of, legal relief. McGuire.[*]. A court in equity was empowered to provide monetary awards that were incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief.