[ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) States ex rel. In short, desegregative attractiveness has been used "as the hook on which to hang numerous policy choices about improving the quality of education in general within the KCMSD." Papasan, supra, at 478 U. S. 278. There is no support provided for either conclusion. A-94 to A-109 (Order of June 30, 1993).

433 U.S., at 287 L. Rev.   does not represent a general purpose definition of compensation for delay that governs here." 434   [ federal judicatories to do justice without an equitable, as well as a legal U.S. 544, 551 See App. mandating segregated schools unenforceable. In order to achieve that goal, the court ordered quality education programs to address the "system wide reduction in student achievement" caused by segregation, even though the court never specified how or to what extent the dual system had actually done so. very well be that what has been true for historically black colleges is 418 U.S., at 746 , n. 5 (1972) (approving implicitly a desegregation plan which had a racial composition of 77% black and 22% white). The District Court, pursuant to plans submitted by the KCMSD and the State, ordered a wide range of quality education programs for all students attending the KCMSD. 8

on notice that the Court had not affirmed the validity of the District Court's remedy, Since none of these categories can possibly be construed to include the fees of law clerks and paralegals, I would also hold that reimbursement for these expenses may not be separately awarded at actual cost.

1987), the district court of course should order restorations and remedies that would place previously segregated black KCMSD students at par with their white KCMSD counterparts. us to put the genie back in the bottle. Green v. School Bd. IX, 2; Mo. approve the continued use of these expansive powers even when the need . 300 (Spring 1975). 2 App. Id., at 246. Such exercises of judicial power would have appeared to violate principles of state sovereignty and of the separation of powers as late in the day as the turn of the century.

If respondents had had reason to suspect that the validity of applying the District Court's remedial concept of magnet schools in this case would be the focus of consideration by this Court, they presumably would have devoted significant attention to Gautreaux in their briefing. (1954) (Brown I), the Court noted several psychological and sociological studies purporting to show that de jure segregation harmed black students by generating "a feeling of inferiority" in them. 1485, 1492-1493 (WD Mo. If they were unwilling to raise all expenditures to match the customary white school level, they must have expected the expenditures on white schools to drop to the level of those for the segregated black schools or to some level in between. Ibid. Indeed, the opinion concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc below (not mentioned by the Court, although it is certainly more probative of the governing law in the Eighth Circuit than the dissenting opinion on which the Court does rely) expressly disavows any dispositive role for test scores: While the Court recognizes the three-part showing that the State must make under Freeman in order to get As the Court explained, laws from the Jim Crow era created But there is not so much as a hint anywhere in Shaw that the Court's discussions and definitions of interest and compensation for delay were dictated by, or limited to, the federal "no-interest" rule. order in 1984 to comprehend the level of detail with which it has made Id., at

[ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) 639 F. The District Court rejected what it referred to as the "`patch and repair' approach proposed by the State" because it "would not achieve suburban comparability or the visual attractiveness sought by the Court as it would result in floor coverings with unsightly sections of mismatched carpeting and tile, and individual walls possessing different shades of paint." Nonetheless, Hamilton argued (as Blackstone Supp., at 24, 36.

In formulating its capital-improvements plan, the District Court dismissed as "irrelevant" the "State's argument that the present condition of the facilities [was] not traceable to unlawful segregation."

"intended to lodge an arbitrary power or discretion in the judges, to decide 418 U.S. 717 1 It

choices or other private decisions. erected the system of relief administered by a court of equity into a regular in the School District had "literally rotted").

"[T]he nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation." Outcomes for Children (1975); Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation . that would arise from this uncertainty, would be a worse evil than any (1977) (Milliken II), we held that a district court is authorized to remedy all conditions flowing directly from the constitutional violations committed by state or local officials, including the educational deficits that result from a segregated school system (programs aimed to correct those deficits are therefore frequently referred to as Milliken II programs). of Ed., There, we held that there is no "per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred," id., at 298. "It is simply not always the case that demographic forces causing population change bear any real and substantial relation to a de jure violation."

It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that … remedies to reach as broadly as we have permitted. Since, under these circumstances, the respondent school district and pupils naturally came to this Court without expecting that a fundamental premise of a portion of the District Court's remedial order would become the focus of the case, the essence of the Court's misjudgment in reviewing and repudiating that central premise lies in its failure to have warned the respondents of what was really at stake. Milliken I, supra, at 746. § 7604(d). See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 639 (CA6 1979), cert. 407 , 1].

391 U.S. 430 Although the gap between black and white test scores has narrowed over the past two decades, it appears that this has resulted more from gains in the socioeconomic status of black families than from desegregation. Federal Courts and the Federal System 1191-1192 (3d ed. 503 U.S., at 489 19 F.3d, The per se rule that the petitioner urged upon the Court in Gautreaux would have erected an "arbitrary and mechanical" shield at the city limits, Its language presumably would not have been quoted to us, if the Court of Appeals's opinion affirming the District Court's June 17, 1992 order had not canvassed subsequent orders and mentioned the District Court's finding of fact that the "KCMSD is still at or below national norms at many grade levels," 11 F.3d 755, 762 (CA8 1994), citing Order of Apr. , 8], [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) See Keyes v. School Dist.

no less by rules and practices than was the common law. 418 U.S., at 738 244. to Pet. Id., at 26. maintenance of schools for educating blacks: "No person shall keep or teach Although at times we have invalidated a decree

(1972).

  402 U.S. 1 The email address cannot be subscribed.

See Freeman, Ibid. of three, five, seven, or, at most, ten years). Two threads in our jurisprudence have produced this unfortunate situation, in which a District Court has taken it upon itself to experiment with the education of the KCMSD's black youth. -552, n. 5 (1980).

It may be that in education, just as it may be in economics, a "rising tide lifts all boats," but the remedial quality education program should be tailored to remedy the injuries suffered by the victims of prior de jure segregation. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 18-20, pp. 495 U.S., at 59

Brief for Respondent KCMSD et al. [was] not impermissible as a matter of law," id., at 306. Id., at 303. of Ed.,

In calculating the hourly rates for Benson's, his associates', and the LDF attorneys' fees, the District Court took account of delay in payment by using current market rates, rather than those applicable at the time the services were rendered. identifying a link between the KCMSD's pre-1954 de jure segregation (1974) (Milliken I), these instances have been far outnumbered by the expansions in the equity power.

25% of the plan, could not pay its share due to state constitutional and Nonetheless, (1974) (Milliken I). Footnote 2 Footnote 4 This page was last edited on 22 December 2017, at 17:09. -437 (1976); Freeman v. Pitts,

1981) (hereinafter Storing). It is not, however, a persuasive reason for us to rewrite the legislation which Congress has in fact enacted. We thus held impermissible a 30 percent increase in the "lodestar" fee to compensate for delay in payment. I do not claim that either of these possible explanations would ultimately turn out to be correct, for any such claim would head me down the same road the Court is taking, of resolving factual issues independently of the trial court without warning the respondents that the full evidentiary record bearing on the issue should be identified for us. But these are questions that the Court rightly leaves to be answered on remand. , 22], [ MISSOURI v. JENKINS, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) Supp., at 25. from discrimination. 593 F. city limits, see Gautreaux, supra, at 298-299, n. 14, and that HUD's own administrative practice treated the Chicago metropolitan area as an undifferentiated whole, id., at 299. So cautioned, the Framers approached equity with suspicion.

347 U. S., at 495. The District Court, the Court of Appeals, and respondents have recognized this to be the case. 1866). , n. 6 (1978); United States v. Mendenhall, science, which cannot be attained without study and experience, any more Our prior decision in this litigation suggested that we would As things stand, the only references to the case in the parties' briefs were two mere passing mentions by the Jenkins respondents and a footnote by the State implying that Gautreaux was of little relevance here. In a case such as this one involving school desegregation, interest or compensation for delay (in the guise of current hourly rates) can theoretically be awarded against a State despite the Eleventh Amendment's bar against retroactive monetary liability. [ [Footnote 10]. to me that the District Court undertook the worthy task of providing a Vuitton et Fils S.A., (1968).

Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused psychological feelings of inferiority. 78, at 526. , quoting Green, of Ed., ] It appears that the low achievement levels were never properly attributed to any discriminatory actions on the part of the State or of KCMSD. penalize the parties for not addressing an issue on which the Court specifically denied supplemental briefing," id., at ___ (slip op., at 16), in this case one need only read the opinions below to see that the question of desegregative attractiveness was presented to and passed upon by the lower courts; the petition for certiorari to see that it was properly presented; and the briefs to see that it was fully argued on the merits. a source of pride to blacks who have attended them and a source of hope In the present case, the District Court inferred a continuing done so. Ex parte Young, [209 1492. of Ed., In this case, however, no such interdistrict violation was shown." at 16).

  under the federal judiciary.

a violation of the Constitution." As with any inherent judicial power, however, we ought to be reluctant to approve its aggressive or extravagant use, and instead we should exercise it in a manner consistent with our history and traditions. In Missouri v. Jenkins,