Pp.

But as to the charges for which Moulton’s right to counsel had already attached, his incriminating statements should have been ruled inadmissible at trial, given the circumstances in which they were acquired.’ ” 474 U.S., at 168 (quoting State v. Moulton, 481 A. After his conviction and death sentence, Cobb appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the grounds that his confession had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He was sentenced to death. This Court upheld the federal habeas court’s conclusion that police had violated the suspect’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, law enforcement officials investigating an individual suspected of committing one crime and formally charged with having committed another crime obviously seek to discover evidence useful at trial of either crime. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. The Texas Court of Appeal held that Cobb's confession regarding an uncharged murder offense when he was charged with burglary, was inadmissible. While simultaneously conceding that its own test “lacks the precision for which police officers may hope,” post, at 10, the dissent suggests that adopting Blockburger’s definition of “offense” will prove difficult to administer. Respondent then stated: “I went back to her house and I saw the baby laying on its bed. It started going toward its mom and it fell in the hole. Pp. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he argued, inter alia, that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which he claimed attached when counsel was appointed in the burglary case. Respondent later led police to the location where he had buried the victims’ bodies. Constitutional rights are not defined by inferences from opinions which did not address the question at issue. See also id., at 168 (“[T]he purpose of their meeting was to discuss the pending charges”); id., at 177 (“[T]he police knew … that Moulton and [the informant] were meeting for the express purpose of discussing the pending charges …” (emphasis added)).

At the suggestion of police, the informant recorded several telephone calls and one face-to-face conversation he had with Moulton during which the two discussed their criminal exploits and possible alibis. §19.03(a)(7)(A) (1994). See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223—1224 (CA9 1999); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013 (CA4 1998); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 (CA6 1997); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41 (CA3 1997); United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (CA5 1993); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 425 Mass. No.

Along the way, one of the officers persuaded the suspect to lead police to the victim’s body.

First, there can be no doubt that a suspect must be apprised of his rights against compulsory self-incrimination and to consult with an attorney before authorities may conduct custodial interrogation. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas is reversed. Here, police scrupulously followed Miranda’s dictates when questioning respondent. See also Moulton, supra, at 180 (“[T]o exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at the time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public’s interest in the investigation of criminal activities”).

While under arrest for an unrelated offense, respondent confessed to a home burglary, but denied knowledge of a woman and child’s disappearance from the home. The court further found that respondent had asserted that right by accepting Ridley’s appointment in the burglary case. CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS No. TEXAS v. COBB(2001) No. This differed from the more ambiguous “closely related” test the minority felt was appropriate for Sixth Amendment considerations. Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respondent’s conviction by a divided vote and remanded for a new trial. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and does not always extend to offenses that are closely related to those where the right has been attached. Respondent told police that he dragged her body to a wooded area a few hundred yards from the house. ), the dissenters give short shrift to the Fifth Amendment’s role (as expressed in Miranda and Dickerson) in protecting a defendant’s right to consult with counsel before talking to police. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings–whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Id., at 175 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this sense, we could just as easily describe the Sixth Amendment as “prosecution specific,” insofar as it prevents discussion of charged offenses as well as offenses that, under Blockburger, could not be the subject of a later prosecution. for Cert. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches not only to the offense with which he is charged, but to other offenses “closely related … Cobb later retained an attorney to represent him for the burglary charge but didn’t have one for the case involving the woman and child. Compare Texas Penal Code Ann. We held that the officer’s comments to the suspect constituted interrogation and that the suspect had not validly waived his right to counsel by responding to the officer. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined. They also have an interest in investigating new or additional crimes. Every profession is competent to define the standards of conduct for its members, but such standards are obviously not controlling in interpretation of constitutional provisions. Relying on Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), respondent contended that his right to counsel had attached when Ridley was appointed in the burglary case and that Odessa police were therefore required to secure Ridley’s permission before proceeding with the interrogation. This decision reaffirmed the Court's holding in McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) by concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the onset of adversarial proceedings. Curiously, while predicting disastrous consequences for the core values underlying the Sixth Amendment, see post, at 3—7 (opinion of Breyer, J. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, respondent argued, inter alia, that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, we held that a defendant’s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses.

Even though the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has not attached to uncharged offenses, defendants retain the ability under Miranda to refuse any police questioning, and, indeed, charged defendants presumably have met with counsel and have had the opportunity to discuss whether it is advisable to invoke those Fifth Amendment rights. But it is the dissent’s vague iterations of the “ ‘closely related to’ ” or “ ‘inextricably intertwined with’ ” test, post, at 10, that would defy simple application.

(b) Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel clearly attaches only to charged offenses, this Court has recognized in other contexts that the definition of an “offense” is not necessarily limited to the four corners of a charging document. He was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating Cobb regarding the murders [uncharged offense], and his confession was therefore admissible. Thus, in all but the rarest of cases, the Court’s decision today will have no impact whatsoever upon a defendant’s ability to protect his Sixth Amendment right. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. While under arrest for an unrelated offense, respondent confessed to a home burglary, but denied knowledge of a woman and child's disappearance from the home. He denied involvement. 99-1702. That’s all I could find. Cobb's death sentence was later commuted to life in prison after the Supreme Court banned the death penalty for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons (2005), as Cobb was 17 at the time of the murder. Respondent explained that when Margaret confronted him as he was attempting to remove the Owings’ stereo, he stabbed her in the stomach with a knife he was carrying. The suspect ultimately was convicted of the girl’s murder. Des Moines police traveled to Davenport, took the man into custody, and began the drive back to Des Moines.