§ 1681 et seq. It seems quite obvious that both of those purposes would be served — not frustrated — by providing a damages remedy in a case of this kind. See. Ante, at 304-305. Their relationship continued through the summer and into the following school year, and they often had intercourse during class time, although never on school property. Lago Vista received federal funds at all pertinent times. The majority's inappropriate reliance on Title IX's administrative enforcement scheme to limit the availability of a damages remedy leads the Court to require not only actual knowledge on the part of "an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf," but also that official's "refus[al] to take action," or "deliberate indifference" toward the harassment. of Education, Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harrassment Policy Guidance, 62 Fed. .

Mr. Chief Justice, may it please the Court: The issue in this case is the standard under which a school district can be held liable for violation of Title IX of the education amendments when one of its teachers intentionally discriminates against one of his students by engaging in sexual harassment of her.
§ 2000d-7 (abrogating the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. During the book discussion sessions, Waldrop often made sexually suggestive comments to the students. The Franklin opinion does not suggest, however, that that allegation was relevant to its holding that the school district could be liable in damages for an intentional violation of Title IX as a result of teacher-student harassment. * Enter a valid Journal (must The Court also suggests that the fact that Congress has imposed a ceiling on the amount of damages that may be recovered in Title VII cases, see 42 U.S.C. 441 U.S., at 694-698; see also id., at 703 ("We have no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited discrimination"). They point to Department of Education regulations requiring each funding recipient to "adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution" of discrimination complaints, Whether educational institutions can be said to violate Title IX based solely on principles of, In the spring of 1991, when petitioner Alida Star Gebser was an eighth-grade student at a middle school in respondent Lago Vista Independent School District (Lago Vista), she joined a high school book discussion group led by Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista's high school. It is important to emphasize that in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the Court confronted a question of statutory construction. Well, I think in Oncale we said it wasn't. Gebser, then a high school freshman, stated that she "was terrified": "He was the main teacher at the school with whom I had discussions, and I didn't know what to do.

§ 1979, Title IX provides in pertinent part : "No person .

of Ed.
The fact that he did not prevent his own harassment of Gebser is the consequence of his lack of will, not his lack of authority. 503 U.S., at 72.

Petitioners and the United States submit that, in light of Franklin's comparison of teacher-student harassment with supervisor-employee harassment, agency principles should likewise apply in Title IX actions. § 1983, and state negligence law, and claims against Waldrop primarily under state law.

§ 106.8(b) (1997), and to notify students and others that "it does not discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational programs or activities which it operates," § 106.9(a). In addition, although the general presumption that courts can award any appropriate relief in an established cause of action, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), coupled with Congress' abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX, see 42 U.S.C.

As long as the intent of Congress is clear, an implicit command has the same legal force as one that is explicit. Because the express remedial scheme under Title IX is predicated upon notice to an "appropriate person" and an opportunity to rectify any violation, We think, moreover, that the response must amount to deliberate indifference to discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. A rule providing an affirmative defense for districts that adopt and publish such policies pursuant to the regulations would not likely be helpful to respondent, however, because it is not at all clear whether respondent adopted any such policy, and there is no evidence that such a policy was made available to students, as required by regulation. I was bewildered and terrified and I had no idea where to go from where I was."

When a teacher's sexual harassment is imputed to a school district or when a school district is deemed to have "constructively" known of the teacher's harassment, by assumption the district had no actual knowledge of the teacher's conduct. Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Musick, Peeler, supra, at 294-295; North Haven Bd. No one questions that a student suffers extraordinary harm when subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher, and that the teacher's conduct is reprehensible and undermines the basic purposes of the educational system. This principle originated in the English common law, and Blackstone described it as `a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.' The decision represented our considered judgment about the intent of the Congress that enacted Title IX in 1972. When Congress attaches conditions to the award of federal funds under its spending power, U.S. Gebser and her mother filed suit against Lago Vista and Waldrop in state court in November 1993, raising claims against the school district under Title IX, Rev. Ante, at 287 (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S., at 74). See id., at 72.