Where all the effective means of inducing political changes are left free from interference, education in the abandonment of foolish legislation is itself a training in liberty. If legislation or regulations of boards conflict with it, they must give way; for the fundamental law is of superior obligation. 197, 79 L.Ed. 159, 62 L.Ed. In the cases just mentioned the Court was of opinion that there were ways enough to secure the legitimate state end without infringing the asserted immunity, or that the inconvenience caused by the inability to secure that end satisfactorily through other means, did not outweigh freedom of speech or religion. The framers were not unaware that under the system which they created most governmental curtailments of personal liberty would have the support of a legislative judgment that the public interest would be better served by its curtailment than by its constitutional protection. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: '5. Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged ten, were expelled from the public schools of Minersville, Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise. The case before us must be viewed as though the legislature of Pennsylvania had itself formally directed the flag-salute for the children of Minersville; had made no exemption for children whose parents were possessed of conscientious scruples like those of the Gobitis family; and had indicated its belief in the desirable ends to be secured by having its public school children share a common experience at those periods of development when their minds are supposedly receptive to its assimilation, by an exercise appropriate in time and place and setting, and one designed to evoke in them appreciation of the nation's hopes and dreams, its sufferings and sacrifices. Lowry et al v. Watson Chapel School District et al Case 5:06-cv-00262-JLH Doc. 'We live by symbols.' For the courts to so hold would be for them to abdicate the most important duty which rests on them under the Constitution. For by this law the state seeks to coerce these children to express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their deepest religious convictions. 786, 83 L.Ed. —-, decided this Term, May 20, 1940. 1. Government has a right to survive and powers conferred upon it are not necessarily set at naught by the express prohibitions of the Bill of Rights. The salute to the flag is an expression of the homage of the soul. 427, 40 L.Ed. They are ready and willing to obey all its laws which do not conflict with what they sincerely believe to be the higher commandments of God. 278; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. Nor does the freedom of speech assured by Due Process move in a more absolute circle of immunity than that enjoyed by religious freedom. Likewise the Constitution assures generous immunity to the individual from imposition of penalties for offending, in the course of his own religious activities, the religious views of others, be they a minority or those who are dominant in government. The flag is dishonored by a salute by a child in reluctant and terrified obedience to a command of secular authority which clashes with the dictates of conscience". 155: "In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. No. v. GOBITIS et al. Tested by this standard, I am not prepared to say that the right of this small and helpless minority, including children having a strong religious conviction, whether they understand its nature or not, to refrain from an expression obnoxious to their religion, is to be overborne by the interest of the state in maintaining discipline in the schools. A society which is dedicated to the preservation of these ultimate values of civilization may in self-protection utilize the educational process for inculcating those almost unconscious feelings which bind men together in a comprehending loyalty, whatever may be their lesser differences and difficulties. But the manifold character of man's relations may bring his conception of religious duty into conflict with the secular interests of his fellow-men. Or to phrase the matter differently, must the religious freedom of plaintiffs give way because there is a clear and present danger to the state if these school children do not salute the flag, as they are required to do? 637; Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 38 S.Ct. '4. Surely, it cannot be that the nation is endangered more by the refusal of school children, for religious reasons, to salute the flag than by the advocacy on the part of grown men of doctrines which tend towards the overthrow of the government. If these guaranties are to have any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the state any authority to compel belief or the expression of it where that expression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion. It may suppress religious practices dangerous to morals, and presumably those also which are inimical to public safety, health and good order. To fight out the wise use of legislative authority in the forum of public opinion and before legislative assemblies rather than to transfer such a contest to the judicial arena, serves to vindicate the self-confidence of a free people.7. 108 F.2d 683, 689. So here, even if we believe that such compulsions will contribute to national unity, there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism which are the sources of national unity, than by compelling the pupil to affirm that which he does not believe and by commanding a form of affirmance which violates his religious convictions. Can it be said by the Court, then, in the exercise of the duty to examine the regulation here in question, that the requirement that school children salute the flag has such direct relation to the safety of the state, that the conscientious objections of plaintiffs must give way to it? Gen. of West Virginia, for defendants. 1375, 127 A.L.R. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our independent judgment. In these cases it was pointed out that where there are competing demands of the interests of government and of liberty under the Constitution, and where the performance of governmental functions is brought into conflict with specific constitutional restrictions, there must, when that is possible, be reasonable accommodation between them so as to preserve the essentials of both and that it is the function of courts to determine whether such accommodation is reasonably possible. I cannot conceive that in prescribing, as limitations upon the powers of government, the freedom of the mind and spirit secured by the explicit guaranties of freedom of speech and religion, they intended or rightly could have left any latitude for a legislative judgment that the compulsory expression of belief which violates religious convictions would better serve the public interest than their protection. The case was heard on application for interlocutory injunction; but the parties have agreed that it be submitted for final decree on the bill and motion to dismiss. In such circumstances careful scrutiny of legislative efforts to secure conformity of belief and opinion by a compulsory affirmation of the desired belief, is especially needful if civil rights are to receive any protection. The Gobitis children were of an age for which Pennsylvania makes school attendance compulsory. He sought to enjoin the authorities from continuing to exact participation in the flag-salute ceremony as a condition of his children's attendance at the Minersville school. The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to the safety of the state." MINERSVILLE SCHOOL DIST. 5—6; Wiener, Roger Williams' Contribution to Modern Thought, 28 Rhode Island Historical Society Collections, No. v. GOBITIS(1940) No. So pervasive is the acceptance of this precious right that its scope is brought into question, as here, only when the conscience of individuals collides with the felt necessities of society. We are dealing here with the formative period in the development of citizenship. The religious freedom guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments means that he shall have the right to do this, whether his belief is reasonable or not, without interference from anyone, so long as his action or refusal to act is not directly harmful to the society of which he forms a part. 349, L.R.A.1918C, 361, Ann.Cas.1918B, 856, and subject them to military training despite their religious objections. But to the legislature no less than to courts is committed the guardianship of deeply-cherished liberties. 468. 1423, and Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. Judicial nullification of legislation cannot be justified by attributing to the framers of the Bill of Rights views for which there is no historic warrant. Our present task then, as so often the case with courts, is to reconcile two rights in order to prevent either from destroying the other. It is not denied that such compulsion is a prohibited infringement of personal liberty, freedom of speech and religion, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, except in so far as it may be justified and supported as a proper exercise of the state's power over public education. Compare Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. v. GOBITIS et al. Courts may decide whether the public welfare is jeopardized by acts done or omitted because of religious belief; but they have nothing to do with determining the reasonableness of the belief. 971. Argued April 25, 1940.-Decided June 3, 1940. The local Board of Education required both teachers and pupils to participate in this ceremony. 1493, the flag salute which it requires cannot be held a violation of the religious rights of plaintiffs. 406, 71 L.Ed. Mr. Joseph W. Henderson, of Philadelphia, Pa., for petitioners. For by this law the state seeks to coerce these children to express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their deepest religious convictions. It would not be worth the paper it is written on, if no legislature or school board were bound to respect it except in so far as it might accord with the policy they might choose to follow. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed.

No question is raised as to jurisdiction; and it appears from the face of the bill that the case is one arising under the Constitution of the United States involving, as to each plaintiff, a sum in excess of $3,000, since it is alleged that each of plaintiffs would be required to incur expense in excess of that amount if their children should be excluded from the public schools. He may not refuse to bear arms or pay taxes because of religious scruples, nor may he engage in polygamy or any other practice directly hurtful to the safety, morals, health or general welfare of the community. 1070, 39 A.L.R. It certainly cannot strengthen the Republic, or help the state in any way, to require persons to give a salute which they have conscientious scruples against giving, or to deprive them of an education because they refuse to give it. Admittedly plaintiffs and their children do have conscientious scruples, whether reasonable or not, against saluting the flag, and these scruples are based on religious grounds.